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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, preoccupied by the debt crisis, 
the fragility of its financial institutions, the fight 
it wages for growth and against unemployment, 
and the rise of populism, the European Union 
(EU) failed to strengthen, let alone increase its 
influence and presence on the international 
stage. 
Therefore, a couple of weeks before European 
citizens are called to exercise their great 
democratic right to elect a new European 
Parliament, the big question is this: in light of 
harsh realities and past failures, what can 
reasonably be done by the next Parliament to 
make significant progress with the Union’s 
foreign policy? 
THE DECLINE OF EUROPE 
The reasons of this decline are no secret. 
However, the degradation of its economic 
impact relative to the significant growth of 
emerging markets should be mentioned. These 
emerging markets used market capitalism 
bolstered by information technologies to create 
economic and social development of exceptional 
speed and scope, thus greatly reducing poverty. 
Despite the hopes raised by the most 
recent Treaties, the Lisbon Treaty in 
particular, the European Union has 
been unable to strengthen, let alone 
develop its role on the international 
stage. A couple of weeks away from the 
European Parliament elections, we 
need to ask ourselves what can 
reasonably be done by the upcoming 
Parliament to ensure that significant 
progress is made with respect to the 
EU’s foreign policy. 
Some of this progress could result from 
the implementation of the European 
Security Strategy or originate from the 
role and initiatives of the High 
Representative/Vice-president of the 
Commission. In addition, rethinking 
specific approaches could allow for 
significant improvements in key areas 
such as the EU’s dealings with 
neighbouring countries, its commercial 
relationship with the US, its energy 
security or its common security and 
defence policy. 
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It did not take long for a complete reshuffle of 
global geopolitics to follow. 
Europe, having lost much of its former 
technological upper hand and having to bear the 
high cost of its social model, is clearly losing a 
lot of its competitiveness on global markets. 
It no longer is a matter of strengthening the 
EU’s place in the world, but a question of 
restoring it. To that end, the consolidation of 
the single currency would be the place to start 
because the euro’s equivalence to the 
deutschemark has allowed it to keep its 
credibility. To make its voice heard, the EU’s 
only alternative is to prioritise the exit from the 
financial, economic and social crisis and to 
consolidate the single currency. Succeeding at 
both these tasks requires greater political 
integration, and an increase in shared monetary, 
economic, fiscal and social sovereignty also calls 
for stronger democratic legitimacy within the 
EU. 
A lot of hope was placed in the political role and 
influence of the EU in the world when the 
Maastricht Treaty was signed, because it 
institutionalised the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). This treaty was a 
political statement in answer to the upheaval of 
the European continent: the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the democratisation of Eastern and 
Central European countries, of the Balkans, and 
the German reunification to mention only the 
main events : it revealed just how much appeal 
was generated by a forward-thinking Europe.  
This treaty established specific objectives for the 
EU’s foreign policy and served as a base for the 
gradual improvement of these objectives until 
the Lisbon Treaty, which brought together all of 
the EU’s external action objectives under Art. 
21. For example, we should mention: 
 Safekeeping the EU’s values, fundamental 
interests, safety, independence, and integrity; 
 Consolidating and upholding democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights and the principles 
of international law; 
 Preserving the peace, preventing conflicts 
and strengthening international security. 
Quite a big undertaking! 
These three objectives bear testimony to the 
very high hopes placed in the EU by its 
Members States. It seems obvious that 20 years 
later, the results are few and far between, and a 
far cry from what had been announced. 
It’s true that the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP) was created at the dawn of the 
violent uprisings that would be characteristic of 
the post-Cold War era: ethnic cleansing in ex-
Yugoslavia, the Rwandan genocide, the reprisal 
of Israeli-Palestinian hostilities on top of the 
9/11 terrorist attacks, the Iraq war, and more 
recently the wars in Libya, Syria and Mali. In all 
of these conflicts, the EU most often proved 
itself powerless, absent, or spectacularly divided 
as was the case over Iraq or the military 
operations in Libya. 
This track record is clearly a negative one, and 
above all it reveals the disagreements between 
Member States over the needs, aims and content 
of a foreign policy for the EU. It also reveals the 
Europeans’ predilection for institutional 
commitment and convoluted flow charts, for 
legal subtleties with no operational impact like 
constructive abstention, and for diplomatic 
interventions made of sweeping, high-flying 
statements illustrated by the numerous common 
positions that emerge from the Council of the 
EU as well as innumerable conclusions about 
major international crises originating from 
European Councils.  
The main lesson to be learned here is that the 
objectives set out in the Treaties cannot be met 
because of three reasons: the insufficiency of the 
operational capabilities of both the Union and 
its Members States, the predominance of the 
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intergovernmental procedure, and the 
cumbersome decision-taking procedures. 
Therefore, there is a real possibility that the EU 
will be marginalised on the international stage, 
where only the main Member States could hope 
to remain at the forefront; but even then, for 
how long? 
EXISTING STRENGTHS 
Despite this loss of economic and political 
influence, there is no denying that the EU 
possesses a wide array of strengths to play a 
definite role in world affairs. 
The first thing to consider is that the EU derives 
its visibility and influence on the world stage 
from its unity on subjects such as its trade 
policy, competition policy, and the standards it 
sets for the world’s largest market. 
As the first economic power for some time yet, 
it also has the world’s second leading currency 
and spreads over lands that hold 500 million 
citizens who benefit from high living standards 
and a social model sought after throughout the 
world. 
Demographically, the European population is 
ageing and stagnating, but in this it is not alone. 
In 2050, the EU will still be more populated 
than the US, remaining in the third place of 
global rankings behind India and China. The EU 
attracts significant migratory flows, and is the 
main source and destination of tourists in the 
world. 
As member of both the G8 and G20, the EU is 
the largest donor of development aid in the 
world and has imposed itself as a key player in 
the development of the south. The consensus 
on cooperation commits Member States to a 
common set of values and principles. In 
addition to this, it also has one of the world’s 
most efficient humanitarian intervention 
departments in the Humanitarian Aid and Civil 
Protection department of the EC. 
Last but not least, the EU is a powerful and 
influential source of cultural innovation and 
creation. It is seen by a large slice of humanity as 
a model of democracy, stability, and solidarity. 
AVAILABLE INSTRUMENTS 
These are undeniable facts, but the EU is 
equipped with a set of tools to act on the world 
stage that is far from negligible and that only 
needs to be put to better use. 
Its external relations policy instruments are 
among its most notable. For a number of years 
now, this policy implemented by the 
Commission has enabled the development of 
economic relations thanks to hundreds of 
international agreements, and it has secured the 
reliable and influential presence of the EU in a 
great number of countries. 
Supported by its 140 or so delegations in the 
world’s capitals and largest international 
organisations, it has a steady and definite global 
presence with its multiple common policies. We 
already mentioned two of these, both essential: 
its trade policy and its development aid policy. 
We should also mention the external dimensions 
of the environment, agriculture and fisheries, 
transport, energy, research and development, 
and migration policies. 
With the Lisbon Treaty, these delegations went 
from being delegations of the European 
Commission to being delegations of the 
European Union, and gained additional foreign 
policy responsibilities under the authority of the 
new European External Action Service and the 
High Representative/Vice-president of the 
Commission. This is an active administration 
that implements the international agreements at 
the core of European diplomacy. As the sole 
representatives of the EU, these heads of 
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delegation have gained in visibility and 
efficiency. 
In the toolbox at the EU’s disposal can also be 
found a number of instruments and prerogatives 
of the CFSP and the CSDP that were added 
between the Maastricht Treaty and the Lisbon 
Treaty, and that are just waiting to be put to 
better use. 
On the basis of these treaties, a number of 
improvements took place. This does not purport 
to be an exhaustive list, but the following are 
worth mentioning as examples: the Berlin Plus 
agreement, and the 1999 Washington NATO 
Summit that put NATO means and capabilities 
at the disposal of the EU, notably for the 
planning of operations in which the Alliance 
does not involve itself (ALTHEA Operation in 
Bosnia, 2009). 
Let us also recall the decisions of the December 
1999 Helsinki European Council that made the 
deployment of military forces numbering 
between 50.000 and 60.000 people possible. The 
ambition was high: giving the Union the means 
to remain on the field for as long as necessary. 
Although this project has not been 
implemented, it is good that it exists. 
Finally, let us evoke the Lisbon Treaty, which 
enables the Council to entrust an operation to a 
group of Member States that have the required 
means to act. This Treaty also implements 
permanent and structured cooperation 
procedures for defence purposes, more flexible 
than those in place for enhanced cooperation. 
As noted, this is a poor track record and the 
potential of these tools and initiatives has not 
been put to good use. This is mostly due to 
political reasons, as the EU is currently unable 
to agree on a real foreign policy. The EU will 
probably never be a classical power with a 
common foreign policy and defence policy. 
Several times over, Jacques Delors indicated that 
formulating a CFSP would still require a lengthy 
intellectual and political coming of age.  
NECESSARY IMPROVEMENTS WITHIN 
GRASP 
European Security Strategy 
The first priority for the next European policy-
makers will be to put forward, get approved, and 
implement a European Security Strategy that will 
set the priorities in terms of foreign policy 
objectives and the EU’s place in the world.  
We are not starting from scratch. The European 
Security Strategy of 2003 was the Europeans’ 
first attempt at defining their strategic 
environment and selecting the fundamental 
priorities of their foreign policy: an affinity for 
multilateralism, prioritising the Union’s 
neighbour relations in response to its 
geopolitical vision, and the will to commit to the 
management of crises both at the civilian and 
military levels. 
It has now been over 10 years. The Union 
should rethink the conceptual framework and 
update the content of this 2003 attempt, 
combining the Community’s external policy with 
diplomatic and military action. Vision and 
strategy are key elements of the credibility of 
European external action, and vital to the 
building of trust between Member States and to 
the increased coherence of their initiatives. This 
common project needs to be redefined, not to 
overwhelm Member States with the creation of a 
Westphalian Union, but to replace what divides 
us with the interdependencies and the solidarity 
on which our survival depends. There is no 
reason why what was accomplished thanks to 
the impetus of Javier Solana could not be 
updated and repeated. The EU would benefit 
greatly from clarifying what is at stake, 
explaining what the dangers are, and refining its 
approach and priorities. The visibility of EU 
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internal and external initiatives would improve 
significantly. Let’s get to work! 
This is no easy task because the challenge is to 
demonstrate in concrete terms how the interests 
and values of the European peoples are 
threatened, and more importantly, which 
strategies and initiatives will allow us to meet 
those threats and protect our interests to the 
best of our ability. The recent and serious 
developments in Ukraine only add to the need 
for such a process. 
Putting the current toolbox to better use: the 
role of the High Representative 
At this point, wide ranging institutional 
adjustments or reform would be very difficult to 
achieve, which means that the design of the 
external policy will only mature if current 
capabilities and instruments are put to better 
use. For example, I will expand on what I 
believe to be the most promising path, namely 
the possibilities offered by the Lisbon Treaty 
with regards to the office of High 
Representative and its prerogatives. 
The innovative approach of the Lisbon Treaty 
and initiatives such as the High Representative's 
prerogatives and the creation of the External 
Action Service did not produce the expected 
results. Progress is urgently needed in the near 
future. This can be achieved. Remember that the 
High Representative is the Vice-President of the 
Commission and that as such, he is capable of 
ensuring the better coordination of Community 
policies and their external impact. Much remains 
to be done - and can be done - to ensure the 
consistent and coordinated presence of these 
policies outside of our borders. 
In addition to this, the High Representative 
presides over the Foreign Affairs Council. This 
prerogative and responsibility enables him or her 
to direct the work of the Council for 5 years, 
and thus to produce a roadmap setting out the 
topics that need to be discussed during that 
time. The point would be to establish common 
stances feeding into a doctrine and a European 
identity relative to concerns with universal 
appeal. Would it be that difficult to establish a 
common stance to agree on a strategy with Mr 
Putin’s Russia or for our future dealings with 
Africa? There are many areas of interest for 
which the EU could develop and settle its own 
stance at little expense. This would result in a 
clear European doctrine, with a consolidated 
identity, and improved visibility and external 
capabilities. It would be worth a try to bring 
together the Member States with the strongest 
disagreements to see if they can find topics they 
can agree on, outside of the usual 28 Member 
States-strong meetings, and maybe identify 
points of consensus.  
There is no doubt that to coordinate European 
Commission policies (in their external 
dimension), to preside over the Foreign Affairs 
Council or to exercise his or her authority 
relative to the CFSP/CSDP, the High 
Representative must gain in efficiency and 
influence by being able to rely on the 
independence of the External Action Service 
from any and all actions of the Commission and 
Member States. To achieve this, the High 
Representative should be given the effective 
authority to coordinate the services that 
contribute to the Union’s external action. This is 
a case where progress is possible provided that 
existing instruments are used to their fullest 
extent. 
RETHINKING SOME APPROACHES 
The EU and its neighbours 
Enlargement policy remains of the main 
instruments of the elusive « Foreign and Security 
Policy ». This policy has already made it possible 
for the EU to contribute to the stability and 
economic development of many of its 
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neighbouring countries, and consequently 
became a major vector of the EU’s influence. 
Although the prospect of accession cannot be 
the only instrument in the European 
neighbourhood policy arsenal, it is worth 
underlining that it has not yet lost all of its 
political power. 
Nevertheless, several points of the EU’s 
enlargement strategy should be revised. It can 
only become more efficient and more legitimate 
by going through legal, social, and political 
adjustments. Faced with the naivety and political 
rush that were characteristic of the last 
enlargements, what now matters is to proceed 
more carefully through the enlargement process, 
by making sure that candidates are subject to 
stricter controls both during the negotiations 
and during the actual process. It is imperative to 
make sure that the new countries are fully 
capable of respecting and functioning according 
to the rule of law that guarantees public 
freedoms. 
It is probable that no other accession will take 
place in the next couple of years, principally for 
political reasons, but that possibility should be 
left open. A clear EU stance on the external 
borders of Europe should also be defined in 
order to prevent any further inconsiderate 
enlargements.  
Similarly to the Eastern revolutions in recent 
years, the Arab Spring has led to the 
consolidation of another pillar of external policy, 
namely the « European Neighbourhood Policy », 
which was raised to the rank of common policy 
by the Lisbon Treaty. Introduced at the 
beginning of the years 2000, it has produced 
mixed results. It was meant to attract our 
southern and eastern neighbours with 
agreements based around common values, thus 
enabling them to improve their democratic life 
and economic integration with the domestic 
market. There is no denying that we are quite 
off the mark, but this has more to do with the 
internal upheaval of these countries than with 
the political failure of neighbouring countries. 
Many partner countries are now facing serious 
political, economic, social, security, or even 
humanitarian crises – be it in the south with 
Syria, Egypt, Libya or Tunisia or to the east with 
Ukraine, Georgia, etc. 
Many of these countries no longer have any 
desire to create additional ties with the EU; 
because of ideological reasons that often have to 
do with an estrangement from Western values; 
because they fail to see any sufficiently tangible 
benefits to this rapprochement; or because, like 
Ukraine, they are divided between those in 
favour of collaborating more closely with the 
EU, and those that want to work more closely 
with Russia. The very objectives of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy that rest on 
sharing values are being challenged more often 
than ever. 
Despite these restrictions, the fact remains that 
the EU’s relationship with its neighbours is of 
the utmost priority. Consequently, this policy 
would benefit greatly from being redirected in 
order to redefine the less-ambiguous, clearer 
stance of the EU relative to two of its key 
partners: Turkey and Russia. 
One of the first tasks the High 
Representative/Vice-President of the 
Commission should tackle with regards to the 
EU’s neighbours will be to offer Member States 
a new, stronger, more realistic global strategy, 
better able to take into account the defence of 
our interests whilst making the European Union 
look more appealing. Once more, the EU has a 
good hand to deal with, both from an economic 
and political standpoint, provided that the 
Member States understand and agree to the 
efforts required to safeguard their long-term 
interests. 
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Trade agreement with the United States 
The fight against unemployment will remain one 
of the major challenges of the EU, but its 
outcome will depend in great part on the 
capability of the Union to develop its external 
trade policy to the benefit of its needs and 
interests. 
In this context, the decision to negotiate a 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) with the United States is a major 
initiative because there is no such agreement 
between partners of this economic weight. 
Together the EU and the US represent close to 
half of the world economy and the trade that 
goes on between them amounts to 30% of all 
global trade. 
The importance of such talks is due to the fact 
that – in addition to what is traditionally at stake 
with free trade agreements (reduction of tariffs, 
restriction of subsidies) – this project also 
touches upon non-tariff barriers. This key point 
would result in a narrowing of regulatory 
differences that would have a bigger impact on 
the increase of trade than any tariff reduction 
could possibly have because it would streamline 
multinational production chains. 
How this negotiation is handled by the EU and 
the scope of the agreement that will be signed 
by the next European Parliament will have a 
significant economic and geopolitical impact. It 
will also incite Europeans to be ambitious in 
their promotion of regulation for regulatory 
convergence at the global level, beyond the 
United States. 
The ultimate challenge will be for the EU to 
take advantage of the TTIP talks and to rely on 
a strategy of active involvement with the new 
economic powers to promote the allocation of 
the competence to monitor regulatory 
convergence to the WTO. This would put 
regulatory convergence in a multilateral 
framework. 
The strengthening of global governance to 
promote cooperation on issues relating to the 
environment, intellectual property, human rights 
or food safety is also at stake. 
Energy security 
Another area where the EU should and can 
make some progress in terms of its external 
policy is that of energy. In recent years, the EU 
has become more and more dependent on 
foreign countries for its needs in energy. The 
EU was already importing 54% of its energy in 
2006 and that figure will climb to 67% in 2030. 
Even though most of the countries in Western 
Europe have diversified their energy supply 
geographically, others – principally countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe, but not only 
– remain completely or mostly dependent on a 
single supplier, namely Russia. Because of this, 
energy not only becomes a factor in the 
competitiveness and sustainable development of 
these countries, but also and increasingly so a 
factor in foreign policy. In this context, the 
safety of energy supply lines is crucially 
important to Europeans. 
The diversification of supply lines is a key 
element of the solution. Therefore it seems 
essential for industrial actors to continue their 
search for new energy sources, as they are doing 
in Africa, for example. It’s also necessary for the 
EU to speak with one voice on the international 
stage for energy to build useful partnerships 
with supplier and transit countries outside of 
European borders, and to find the agreements 
most beneficial to the whole of the EU. This 
would also require the development of 
interconnections in order to pool together some 
supply capabilities. The success of such a project 
would a major step forward for the CSFP. 
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In addition to this, the EU could also adopt a 
stronger stance to use the numerous instruments 
and external action policies it can wield. Thus it 
would essentially be a case of putting into 
perspective its neighbouring policies with the 
East and with the South, strategic partnerships, 
first of all with Russia, but also its enlargement 
policy, notably with Turkey, or its development 
policy, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. It 
would also benefit from continuing with the 
systematic addition of energy objectives to its 
external policies. Here is a task for the next 
Commission and the next External Action 
Service. 
Pragmatic approach in the Common 
Defence and Security Policy 
The CDSO was not conceived with a mind to 
enter the EU in the race for military power in 
which the new economic powers have thrown 
themselves. The defence spending of BRIC 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries has gone 
from 8 to 13,5% between 2001 and 2011, 
relative to a drop from 30% to 18% for 
Europeans, whereas the United States have 
remained at 41%. 
But the traditional dichotomy between territorial 
defence and external intervention no longer 
exists. Most of the new dangers and threats are 
unclear and need to be dealt with outside of EU 
borders. The instability of the EU periphery, 
particularly to the south, requires a great deal of 
strategic planning and a shorter response time. 
This is made even more pressing by the 
willingness of the United States to withdraw 
from this area to focus on Asia. 
Despite its meagre results, the European 
Council of December 2013 had the right 
methodology. Indeed, it resisted the appeal of 
grand and ambitious declarations by focusing on 
specific roadmaps and objectives, including 
among other things an accelerated agenda of 18 
months before they meet again in June 2015. 
The main points of improvement have to do 
with: 
1. Military capabilities: creation of a club for 
users of American drones, commitment to 
produce European drones, development of 
ground resupply capabilities, etc.; 
2. European industry: discussion of strategic 
autonomy with the objective of not having to 
depend on external partners for, among other 
things, the maintenance and spare parts of 
infrastructure in the industrial sector; 
3. The study of the issue of external operations 
financing; 
4. The desire to update the European Security 
Strategy in light of the new threats and 
priorities. 
As recently pointed out by Etienne Davignon, 
the alternative of a “Europe of defense” or 
NATO is out of date. NATO capabilities are no 
longer sufficient to deal with the security 
concerns to the south and in the Mediterranean 
East, as well as the Sahel. Which collective 
instances of crisis management can contribute to 
stabilising the South should be determined. Task 
delegation should also be clarified within the 
Union, notably in the European Commission, 
and community rules should be adapted to the 
highly-specific defence market. 
Of course, we are still too far from the 
objectives set forth by the different Treaties but 
the urgency of certain threats should contribute 
to certain decisions being taken to implement a 
step-by-step policy, the only possible one at this 
point. This policy is indispensable if we want to 
maintain a shred of credibility on the 
international stage. 
CONCLUSION 
If Europe has indeed lost some of its influence 
in the affairs of the world, both from an 
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economic and political standpoint, it does not 
change the fact that it remains a major player. 
The EU’s foreign policy has failed to meet the 
hopes it had raised, but it cannot be denied that 
the EU still has numerous attractive features and 
instruments to deal with current issues and gain 
ground. 
The long intellectual and political coming-of-age 
process discussed by Jacques Delors contains 
real opportunities for common policies that 
could bolster and increase the presence of the 
EU in the world and hold off its loss of 
influence. 
Without being completely thorough, we 
presented a couple of the areas where progress 
is necessary and achievable: the European 
Security Strategy, putting the current tools and 
instruments to better use, the role and action of 
the High Representative/Vice-President of the 
Commission, a new neighbourhood policy, 
going deeper into the areas of trade and energy 
policies, and finally, a pragmatic approach to the 
Security and Defence Policy. 
This significant undertaking will play its part in 
deciding for the renewal or decline of Europe, 
and thus it seems more important than ever for 
the EU to be able to rely on the convergence of 
the positions of Member States. 
The Member States will indeed play a 
determining role, just as much as their respective 
populations will do so through their choice of 
leaders. Consequently, the next elections of the 
European Parliament will be crucially important 
in determining if the assembly will be in favour 
of more Union or not. The ambitions that the 
European Institutions will set for themselves in 
terms of integration for the next couple of years 
will depend on the outcome of this election. 
Eneko Landaburu is currently Member of 
the Board of Directors and Special Advisor 
to the President of Notre Europe – Jacques 
Delors Institute. He was Ambassador of the 
EU in Morocco (2009 – 2013) as well as 
Director General of the European 
Commission, DG for Regional Policy and 
Cohesion, DG for Enlargement, and DG for 
External Relations (1986 – 2009). 
This Policy Brief is part of the publication 
series “The Citizen and the European 
Elections”. The project intends to bring the 
debate on the European elections closer to 
the citizens, by focusing on those EU issues 
that are of particular importance to them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The opinions expressed in this Policy Brief are those of the author(s) alone, and they do not necessarily reflect the views of the Egmont Institute. 
Founded in 1947, EGMONT – Royal Institute for International Relations is an independent and non-profit Brussels-based think tank dedicated to 
interdisciplinary research. 
www.egmontinstitute.be 
 
© Egmont Institute 2014. All rights reserved. 
 
Royal Institute 
for International Relations 
